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Abstract 
Using the approach introduced in Becker (1965) this paper derives rules for optimal taxation 
in the presence of externalities. The same was done in Kleven (2004) in the case where 
externalities were excluded resulting in the inverse factor share rule for optimal taxation. This 
rule states that fast cars should carry a lower tax rate than slow cars because of time savings. 
Including externalities modifies the result and gives a simple extension to the tax formulae. 
The results emphasize that taxation of externalities and revenue-generating taxation of goods 
should not be looked on separately. 
1. Introduction 
In many cities problems related to traffic congestion are increasing. As a result the politicians 
wish to regulate the traffic. It is therefore important to choose the right instruments so that the 
goals set up by the politicians are realized. Should one system be implemented or can other 
instruments achieve the same at lower costs? What problem is the instrument designed to 
address? Can a given instrument be used to generate public revenue? Are the chosen 
instruments politically feasible and how do they interact with the rest of the economy? 
Often the concept of marginal cost pricing is mentioned as a way to internalize the external 
costs of transport and thereby induce an optimal usage of the transport infrastructure. But if a 
tax instrument is to be used it is important to know how the optimal tax scheme is to be 
designed. It is also important to know how people react to a given tax instrument and how this 
influences other parts of the economy. 
In the theory of optimal taxation characterizations of the optimal tax scheme have been 
derived in different situations. Some of the best-known results are the Ramsey rule (Ramsey 
(1927)), the inverse elasticity rule (see for example Sandmo (1976) and Auerbach and Hines 
(2002)) and the Colett-Hague result (Corlett and Hague (1954)). One general conclusion from 
these rules are that the tax system should be constructed such that the distortions to the 
economy is minimized. Note that no distortion does not mean no effect on demand. 
Introducing taxes even in a lump sum way would introduce changes in the economy through 
the income effects. The point is that the substitution effects should be minimized. The reason 
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 for this is that when some goods are taxed and other goods are not the consumers change their 
consumption behavior away from the first best and is at the core of the discussion of the 
taxation of labor income where the tax raises the relative price of work and lowers the price of 
leisure inducing lower work participation and higher demand for leisure. This problem is 
essentially what is dealt with in Kleven (2004). He demonstrates that the inverse elasticity 
rule also emerges in the Becker setup though in a modified form named the inverse factor 
share rule. This rule states that commodities, which reduce time consumption, should be taxed 
less than other goods. The reason for this is that by making more time available by taxing 
time consuming activities the consumers will respond by working more and therefore reduce 
the distortion caused by the income tax. In the case of cars this would indicate that fast cars 
(sport cars) should be taxed less because they increase the time savings involved in transport. 
Kleven points out though that the conclusion might not be so robust if externalities are 
included which is the case considered in the present paper. 
Another result from tax theory deals with taxation as a way to internalize externalities 
referring to these as Marginal Cost Pricing or Pigouvian Taxation (Pigou (1920)). The idea 
behind these taxes is that the externality comes from a misspecification of the price of the 
good in question and by imposing the right tax on the good the price failure can be corrected 
thereby internalizing the externality. A Pigouvian tax may seem very simple when looked 
upon in a world where the only goal is to internalize externalities. The presence of other taxes 
and the fact that the governments in general have to raise revenue to function complicates the 
problem. One must remember though that it is all the taxes in the economy that make up the 
tax system. It is therefore interesting to characterize the optimal tax system when externalities 
are present and the government has to raise revenue. This approach was taken by Sandmo 
(Sandmo (1975)) in the standard model for optimal taxation. Based on his analyses one could 
state that only the actions and goods that cause externalities should be subject to extra 
taxation. This is known as the additivity property or the “principle of targeting”. A similar 
result emerges here when externalities are included. 
This paper will use the approach introduced by Becker (1965) representing time explicitly in 
the utility function to derive formulas that describes the optimal tax rules in the presence of 
externalities thereby extending the results found in Kleven (2004). The extension makes the 
results found by Kleven less clear and emphasizes how externalities can be incorporated into 
the setup. Section 2 will present the model and derive a characterization for the optimal tax 
system. The generalization of this characterization makes it difficult to get clear-cut rules 
about the design of the tax system and section 3 therefore derives results, which gives more 
intuition. Section 4 will discuss the policy implications and the last section concludes 
2. The model 
We assume that there are N+1 commodities and H households in the economy. Each 
household has a utility function with all the usual conditions for continuity and 
differentiability given by 
0 1( , ,..., ) ( ), 1,...,
NN
h h h h hU U Z Z Z Z h Hξ= − =  
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 where 
1
N H N
hh
Z Z==∑  is the total consumption of good N in the economy and 
( , ), 0,...,i i i ih h hZ f X L i N= =  
represents the way good ihZ is produced in household h using one market good
i
hX , time and 
production technology
i
hL
if . We assume the production technology to be Leontief and that 
every household uses the same technology in the production of the different goods. Intuitively 
this means that if a household wants to see a movie at a cinema they have to allocate the time 
required to see the movie and they have to purchase movie tickets. One could argue that more 
than one market good could be required in the production which would result in X being a 
vector of these market goods, but to keep things as simple as possible we here assume that 
only one market good goes into the production of every consumption good. The function ξ is 
assumed to be increasing and hold all the normal properties of continuity and differentiability. 
As a result the total consumption of good N decreases the utility of the households. 
Assuming that the number of households H is large we make the standard assumption that the 
individual household behaves as if 0
N
N
h
Z
Z
∂
∂ = . This assumption can be interpreted as if every 
household knows that it affects the total consumption of good N but regards its contribution 
as insignificant. Using this we can now formulate the optimization problem for household h 
as 
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
, ,..., , , ,...,
0
0
max ( (, ), ( , ),..., ( , ))
. .
N N
h h h h h h
N N N
h h h h h h h h h
X X X L L L
N
i i
h h
i
N
i
h h
i
U f L f X L f X L
s t P X wN
L N T
=
=
=
+ =
∑
∑
 
where w is the wage rate and assumed identical for all households, is the amount of time 
spend on work for household h,  is the consumer price of market good
hN
iP iX  and T is the total 
time available to the household. 
This description of the households shows that these are not only modeled as consumers but 
also as producers. Therefore we start by taking a closer look on the production process taking 
place inside the household. The household seeks to produce the good ihZ in the efficient way. 
This problem can essentially be seen as an attempt to minimize the production costs of every 
unit of ihZ . Letting the factor input coefficients Lia  and be the input of and Xia
iL iX  in the 
production process and assuming that households see as fixed the households solves the 
following problem for every commodity
iP
iZ  
,
min
. . ( , ) 1
Xi Li
i
Xi Lia a
i
Xi Li
P a a
s t f a a
+
=
 
hereby finding the cheapest way to produce one unit of the consumption food iZ . The solution 
is characterized by the unit cost functions and describing the cost of producing ( )iXia P ( )
i
Lia P
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 one unit of iZ measured in factor input. Using the solution to this problem, normalizing both 
wage rate w and total time T to 1 and realizing that the two constraints in the utility 
maximization problem are interdependent (through the variable ), we can restate the 
household’s maximization problem as 
hN
0 1
0 1
, ,...,
0
max ( , ,..., )
. . ( ) 1
N
h h h
N
h h h h
Z Z Z
N
i i i
h
i
U Z Z Z
s t Q P Z
=
=∑  
where  is the total cost of consuming one unit of( )i i i Xi LiQ P P a a= + iZ . To see this remember 
that i
i
X
Xi Za = and iiLLi Za = are constants due to the Leontief production technology. Adding the 
two constraints in the original problem utilizing the normalization of w and T we get the 
single constraint above. Note that is the direct cost of usingi XiP a
iX as input and Lia is the 
value of the time used for the production which equals the earnings lost due to lower working 
time. Therefore is the total cost of consuming one unit of( )i iQ P iZ  and the constraint says 
that the total cost of consumption must equal full income, which is the market value of the 
time endowment. 
Realizing that this essentially is a standard utility maximization problem the solution is well 
known and can be characterized by the factor demand functions 
0 0 1 1( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), )i Nh
N
hZ Q P Q P Q P y  and the indirect utility function 
 where represents artificial non-labor income for 
household h and is given exogenously. Furthermore we know that Roy’s Identity stating that 
0 0 1 1( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), )N NhV Q P Q P Q P yh hy
, 0,...,hk
V k
h hQ
Z k Nλ∂∂ = − =  
and the Slutsky Equation stating that 
  kk kh h
j j h
hZ ZZ
yQ Q
∂ ∂∂
∂∂ ∂= −  
are valid where   khZ is the compensated demand for good khZ . 
Having characterized the households behavior we now focus on the government. We assume 
that the government seeks to maximize a Bergson-Samuelson type social welfare function 
1 2( , ,..., )HW W V V V=  
Because the government takes account of the externalities in the economy the indirect utility 
function the government considers has the following form 
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1
( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), )
( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), ) ( ( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), ))
N N
h h
H
N N N N N
h h h
h
V Q P Q P Q P y
V Q P Q P Q P y Z Q P Q P Q P yξ
=
=
− ∑ h
G
 
Furthermore the government must raise a revenue G resulting in the governmental budget 
constraint 
0 1
( )
N H
i i
h
i h
t X
= =
=∑ ∑  
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 where is the tax rate set by the government. Often it is assumed that good 0 can not be taxed. 
One interpretation of this is that the government can tax goods consumed through the taxation 
of the input of
it
i
hX . But assuming that good 0 is pure leisure and thus having 0 0Xa = the 
government can not tax this good. In the case where the government can tax all goods it 
would be possible to introduce taxes in a first best way. We therefore assume that good 0 is 
untaxable.  
Assuming that the production sector operates under constant returns to scale and that the 
markets are fully competitive the producer prices for goodip iX  are fixed. Defining the tax 
rates as the government therefore has full control over the consumer prices through 
the tax rates and we can write the government’s problem as 
i it P p= − i
1 2
0 0 1 1
1
, ,...,
0 0 1 1
1 1
max ({ ( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), )} )
. . (( )( ( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), )))
N
N N H
h h h
P P P
N H
i i i N N
Xi h h
i h
W V Q P Q P Q P y
s t P p a Z Q P Q P Q P y G
=
= =
− =∑ ∑  
Following Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) we define the social marginal utility of income hβ as 
h
h
h
W
V
β λ∂= ∂  
where hλ is the marginal utility of total income for consumer h. Utilizing this and using the 
Slutsky equation, Roy’s identity and the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix we can now write the 
first order condition for the governments problem as 
 
1 11
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1
( )
, 1,...,
iN HH
kh k h
i Xi hh
i hh h
k H H
k k
h h
h h
N NhH H H
h k h
h N k N h
h h hh h h
H
k
h
h
Zt a ZZ
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Z Z
ZZ Z
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Z
β
µ
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λ
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= =
= = =
=
∂
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∑ ∑
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∑
 
where 
 
1 1
1
kN H
h
i Xi i
i h
k H
k
h
h
Zt a
Qd
Z
= =
=
∂
∂=
∑∑
∑
 
is the index of discouragement defined in Mirrlees (1976). 
This formula characterizes the optimal tax system in the economy. Knowing that the 
compensated demand decreases when the price increases the discouragement index is 
negative (if the tax is positive). The right hand side tells us that if a good is demanded by 
households who are socially important (they have a high value of hβ ) the discouragement 
should be reduced. Furthermore if changes in the demand for goods are highly sensitive to 
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 changes in income (high
i
h
h
Z
y
∂
∂ ) the tax on these goods should also be such that the 
discouragement is smaller. 
To get some intuitive results the following section derives versions of some known tax rules 
known from the standard tax model. 
3. Tax rules 
In this section we will derive several known tax rules. Even though these rules are less 
general than the result found in the previous section they give more clear guidelines as to how 
the politicians should construct the tax system. 
The Ramsey Rule 
If we assume that there are no externalities in the economy the general result reduces to 
1 11
1 1
1 1 , 1,...,
iN HH
kh k h
i Xi hh
i hh h
k H H
k k
h h
h h
Zt a ZZ
yd k
Z Z
β
µ
= ==
= =
∂
∂= − + =
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
N  
which (following Myles (1995)) we by defining 1
1
Hk k
hH
h
Z Z
=
= ∑ can be rewritten as 
1
(1 ), 1,...,
kn h
k
H
Zb
k H Z
h
d k
=
= − − =∑ N  
where
1
ih
h
h
N Zh
i Xi yi
b tβµ
∂
∂== +∑ a is the social marginal utility of income defined in Diamond 
(1975). It is easy to see that if the expression simplifies to hb b=
1, 1,...,kd b k N= − =  
The optimal tax therefore reduces the compensated demand for all goods with the same 
proportion which is the Ramsey Rule. 
The inverse factor share rule 
To obtain the inverse factor share rule found in Kleven (2004) we take the government’s 
maximization problem as a starting point. We assume that the government ignores 
distributional considerations and only seek to maximize the unweighted sum of household’s 
utility. Furthermore we assume that all households are identical and that there are no 
externalities. The first order condition for the government’s optimization problem can then be 
written as 
1
1
, 1,...,ik k
N
Z
i XiQ Z
i
t a k Nλ µµ
− ∂
∂=
= =∑  
If no cross-price effects are present in the economy and we let λ µµθ −=  we get the tax 
formulae 
, 1,...,k
k Xk kk
t
P k Nθα ε= =  
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 where k Xkk
P a
Xk Q
α = is the cost share of kX in the price of kZ  and kkk kQZkk Q Zε ∂∂= is the own price 
elasticity of commodity k. This is the inverse factor share rule saying that goods which uses 
much time in household production should carry a lower tax rate than goods which primarily 
uses market produced commodities in the household production. 
It is easy to see that the inverse elasticity formula is imbedded in this formulation. 
Letting  for the taxable goods the model reduces to the standard model used in the 
analysis of optimal taxation resulting in the inverse elasticity formula stating that goods with 
high own price elasticities should be taxed less in order to reduce the distortions caused by the 
taxation. 
1Xka =
The additivity property 
When externalities are present we can derive a result similar to the one found above. Again 
we take the governments maximization problem as a starting point, assumes that all 
households are identical and that the government maximizes the unweighted sum of 
households utility. This gives the first order condition 
1 1 1
1
, 1,...,N iN k k k k
N
Z Z
i XiZ Q Z Q Z
i
H t a kλ µ ξµ µ
− ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂=
= − + =∑ N  
which gives the tax formulas 
$
$ $
1
'1
(1 ) , 1,..., 1
(1 )
k
k Xk kk
N
NN XN NN XN
t
P
t H
P Q
k Nα ε
ξ
α ε α λ
θ
θ θ
−
−
= − = −
= − +  
where $ λµθ = . For the goods not causing externalities the optimal tax is still determined by the 
inverse factor share rule. When externalities are present the inverse factor share rule still plays 
a rule but the tax rate now also takes account of the externality. It is seen that the extra term in 
the tax formulae enters additively. This additivity property was first noticed in Sandmo (1975) 
in a standard tax model with externalities and discussed further in Kopczuk (2003). The 
interpretation of the result is that when externalities cause consumers to ignore the true 
marginal costs of the goods they consume the tax problem can be separated into two parts. 
First a tax is used to correct the price so that the externalities are reflected in the price facing 
the consumers. Thereafter the normal tax rules are used to generate the required revenue. The 
final tax rates are seen to be a weighted sum of the two terms. Note that if the externality part 
of the tax is high enough the formulas describe how the surplus should be distributed turning 
the tax into a subsidy.  
4. Policy implications in the transport sector and some guidelines 
The tax rules found in the previous section help us to understand how the tax system should 
be designed. If distributional considerations are ignored the inverse factor share rule states 
that “Fast transportation should carry a lower rate of tax than slow transportation” (Kleven 
(2004)) which in the case of cars states that a sports car should be taxed less than a normal 
car. This conclusion is less clear when externalities are included because a faster car might 
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 cause externalities that a slow car does not (for example accidents and pollution). Furthermore 
we can see that if the choice of transport is highly sensitive to changes in its price the tax rate 
should be kept low in order to reduce distortions. If distributional considerations are included 
we see that the conclusion changes because sports cars are normally not used by households 
who are socially important.  
We can summarize these guidelines by saying that 
• goods which require large amounts of time for consumption should be taxed higher 
than other goods. This ensures that the distortions away from market produced goods 
to household produced goods are minimized. It is this distortion that is in the core of 
the discussion concerning the discouragement of labor supply caused by income 
taxation. In the case of car taxes slow cars should be taxed more heavily than fast cars. 
• goods which have a high own-price elasticity should be taxed less in order to reduce 
the distortions in the demand for the goods. Typical necessities have low own-price 
elasticity and should therefore carry a high tax rate. This often clashes with the 
distributional wishes of the governments. 
• if the goods are consumed primarily by socially important households (normally poor 
households) the tax rate should be kept low. This is the normal idea of redistribution 
between income groups and is often seen as one of the purposes of the tax system. 
• if the consumption of a good causes externalities a tax should be levied on the good 
making sure that these are internalized without thinking about the governments budget 
requirements. When the externalities are internalized taxes (or subsidies) are used to 
bring the budget in balance. This is the additivity property. 
We can see that some of these guidelines point in opposite directions especially if 
distributional considerations are included. If the tax revenue raised from the pure Pigouvian 
tax is exactly equal to the revenue required by the government (that is ) no further taxes 
are needed and the tax system is actually first best. But since this is highly unlikely to be the 
case the tax system will probably be of the second best nature. One of the goals of the 
government should therefore be the reduction of the distortions in the economy in general 
leading to the discussion the double dividend (see Goulder (1995) for a discussion).  
$ 1θ =
5. Conclusion and possible extensions 
In this paper we have presented a model for household behavior where time enters the utility 
function directly. Since the consumption of time is very important in the transport sector the 
approach is a natural extension to the traditional microeconomic when this sector is being 
modeled. The method seems very natural if one thinks about the processes taking place in the 
society and it is therefore important to explore the properties of the model.  
We have extended the results by Kleven and included externalities in the approach. We 
showed that the tax formulas emerging resemble those found by Sandmo and we therefore 
conclude that the additivity property survives in this new setup. Furthermore we make it 
possible to see how distributional questions will affect the tax system.  
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 Applied to car transport this means that a fuel tax introduced to internalize pollution might be 
reduced by the fact that the general tax introduced after the externalities has been internalized 
turn out to be lower than expected. This is due to the inverse factor share rule saying that if 
the uses of the fuel saves time it should in general carry a lower tax rate. Whether or not the 
tax should be “high” or “low” depend on the magnitude of these two effects. It is important to 
realize though that the time savings involved in the activities influence the magnitude of the 
distortions in the economy and therefore also the level of the optimal tax rate. 
The model presented here should be generalized in several ways. The modeling of the 
externalities in a separable way could be criticized and alternative ways of modeling this will 
be subject to future research. Furthermore to assume that all households are identical or that 
they earn the same wage might seem unrealistic and the assumption that all households have 
the same technologies available to them could also be questioned. In spite of this we believe 
that the insights from the model are valuable. 
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